Conclusion

Turning the clock back to 1995 might be an escape from the trade confrontation. Costs to US agriculture, although not the agbiotechnology industry, would be politically tolerable, especially in light of the new US Farm Bill. However, it could be a costly long-term outcome for developing country farmers and perhaps impossible anyhow, as GM crops have already been released to the environment. If GM technology is prohibitively restricted now, its potential to help food-insecure regions produce more food in the future will be eliminated. A less restrictive path toward regulatory harmonization could allow compromise between national economic interests and consumers’ cultural and safety concerns without eliminating the possibility for further GMO development. Inclusion of a variety of players in the formation of regulation, perhaps especially including the consumers themselves in the process, will be essential in achieving a satisfactory outcome.

Whichever path is followed, international agreement will be reached by conventional bargaining over texts and intragovernmental procedures for regulation (Keohane et al. , 2000; Cerny, 2001). Negotiations will centre on common practices for government action, such as labelling and safety approval procedures. Outcomes will be resolved by narrowing differences, or where necessary by arbitration such as under WTO dispute rules. International agreements will need to be formed and used to harmonize current practices and reduce uncertainty that is currently inhibiting the development and production of GM crops.

Both those worried about incautious and callow introduction of ‘Franken-foods’ and those eager to expand the use of new GM technology, especially for use by poor-country farmers, want stability in a regulatory regime, and accept the value of careful drafting of codes and statements. At the WTO, and we propose at the Codex and CBD arenas, draft documents, with controversial items bracketed, should allow principal alternatives – including the two discussed above – to be explored. Clearly we favour a more participatory and scientifically based outcome, one that allows flexibility, along with the inevitable escape clauses, as the next outcome in the GM regulatory regime.

If we can move from the fragmented and contested situation of uncertainty and competing standards of risk management, principally between the USA and Europe, to an international regime with more sustainable harmony in both procedures and principles, the potential in GM can be rejuvenated. The alternative to the trade-driven, EU-dominated regulation standards is to empower harmonizing agencies of the international system – OECD, Codex, and Third World oriented IGOs, such as CGIAR – to take the central position in hammering out the standards and regulations for risk assessment and risk management, including safety precautions and labelling requirements. This would occur while paying more attention to the risks attendant to the new technology than occurred during the last decade. At the June 2002 Plus 5 World Food Summit, for instance, delegates recognized the value of biotechnology products for help to impoverished farmers, but also avoided endorsement of any regulatory principles. Beneficial outcomes of such a process would require adoption and subsequent ratification by the majority of international parties. Incorporating the agreed principles into national legislation and policy would follow.

For GM regulation, a single WTO venue, and single debate process is not likely to produce harmonization. The alternatives we envisage are either a model of national decisions controlling outcomes and forcing adaptations to the standard of the most powerful – Europe, in this context or, alternatively, an international forum, such as Codex, allowing key national representatives to meet under the auspices of a joint umbrella that is specialized, focused and sustainable. Unlike the WTO or ‘Summit’ meetings, regime building in this controversial realm requires an incremental and non-confrontational approach.