Selecting Natural Enemies
Ultimately, the success of any
classical biological control campaign rests on finding and establishing
well-adapted and effective natural enemies. There is a informed ecological
reading, but not much that can be used in a practical way when searching for
candidate natural enemies. The challenge is having the foresight to anticipate
the biological interactions following an introduction that ultimately make or
break a candidate natural enemy.
Rather than looking for
natural enemies exclusively based on a set of theoretical characteristics, our
foreign exploration efforts in South America initially focused on regions that
were agroclimatic homologues to regions in Africa where
M.
tanajoa
outbreaks occurred and high populations persisted on a regular
basis (Yaninek and Bellotti, 1987). Within each target region, we looked for
the phytoseiid predators found associated with cassava where
M.
tanajoa
was present, especially at low population densities, and
screened early candidate natural enemies for their ability to feed and
reproduce on
M. tanajoa
before being considered for importation
(Yaninek
et al
., 1993).
Collaboration and Training
This campaign could not have
been implemented without the contributions of national partners in 20
participating countries in Africa, and international experts from four
continents. The campaign foundation was built on a cadre of highly trained and
dedicated core staff developed by a small group of biological control
specialists recruited specifically for this purpose (Herren, 1989). We
recruited and trained local staff to work on basic biology and ecology,
natural-enemy mass production and experimental releases, pre- and post-release
monitoring, and training. The operational team grew to 35 individuals at the
peak of the project. Operational units were supervised by local university graduates
with backgrounds in agriculture and biology. Many of these individuals
eventually completed PhDs, as part of the programme in most instances.
National collaborators
provided the access needed to implement the programme in participating
countries. Typically, a key individual was someone with an interest in plant
protection who worked for the ministry of agriculture. These individuals made
all the contacts and local arrangements required for the programme, including
arranging for the import permits to introduce and monitor biological control
agents. Since most national programme staff had no experience working with
mites of any kind, we routinely arranged subject matter and leadership training
for the primary contacts followed by in-country training of programme support
personnel (Yaninek and Schulthess, 1993; Yaninek
et
al
., 1994).
International cooperators
provided critical expertise beyond the capacity of project personnel in Africa. This included mitetaxonomy, foreign exploration, international quarantine,
selected contract research, and MSc and PhD degree training in some cases.
Reliable taxonomic expertise is often hard to come by, but is essential in
classical biological control projects. We identified plant feeding and
predatory mite specialists as essential collaborators early in the campaign.
Foreign exploration by definition was beyond the boundaries of Africa and required cooperators with a local knowledge of cassava,
M.
tanajoa
and their natural enemies. We contracted for foreign exploration
to be undertaken by collaborators at Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa
Agropecuária (EMBRAPA) in Brazil, and the Centro Internacional de Agricultura
Tropical (CIAT) in Colombia. Natural enemies shipped to Africa for experimental
releases first passed through quarantine in Europe (initially Imperial College in England, then later the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands). Universities in Africa, South America, North America and Europe hosted
project staff and cooperators for higher degree training and produced 15 PhD, 9
MSc and 9 BSc degrees.
We developed and delivered
training in basic acarology and biological control applications as a core
activity for participating national programmes. Hundreds of staff and
collaborators received in-service training every year. Similarly, bench
training was done for 25 national programme collaborators with specialized
needs and implemented through a series of internships. Training created the
basis for all subsequent research and development activities in collaborating
national programmes and is the main reason why the campaign was successful in
most countries.
The Costs
Cassava farmers were not the
only resource-poor constituents associated with this campaign. Most national programme
staff lacked the training, infrastructure, or experience to participate in a
campaign like this without significant operational support. Consequently, the
campaign generated an estimated US$9.5 million to implement the programme from
1983 to 1997 (Table 5.2). We allocated approximately US$680,000 a year for
operations at headquarters, a network of national collaborators that grew to 20
countries, contracted services for foreign exploration, international
quarantine and selected research, and training. National programmes needed
resources for everything from personnel, basic lab and field equipment,
electricity to run the lab, vehicles, fuel, communications, computers, and
often the most basic supplies, e.g. pencils and paper. Considering the urgency
and scope of the problem, the need for basic infrastructure, and the economic
impact of the campaign, the budget was probably a bargain. This investment
created expertise, experiences and infrastructure that subsequently benefited
other biological control activities in the participating national programmes
that far exceeded all expectations (Yaninek and Schulthess, 1993).
Table 5.2.
Summary
expenditures for core project personnel, operations, foreign exploration,
international quarantine, contracts, training and national programmes between
1983 and 1997
Conclusions
The campaign overcame the most
daunting challenges to implementation and achieved a number of significant
firsts, including the first mite pest on a field crop distributed across a
continent to be successfully controlled using introduced natural enemies. This
was achieved in spite of the conventional plant protection wisdom at the time
because a strong biological, agronomic and economic case was made for a
classical biological control solution, and the international donors agreed to
support the programme. Long-term support from the donors maintained the
campaign momentum, while the network of collaborators and national programme
cooperators delivered the programme in more than 20 countries over an initial
period of 15 years. Getting the taxonomy right took some effort, but got the
campaign off on the right foot, while the prescriptive biology and ecology
studies kept us on the right path. These studies directed foreign exploration
and candidate natural enemy selection, and helped us evaluate the impact and
mechanisms of control by the introduced biological control agents. A cadre of
highly trained and dedicated core project staff provided the technical continuity
needed for handling and evaluating introduced phytoseiid predators. National
programme participants gained training and experience working with mites, and
received support needed for the infrastructure and operations required to
participate effectively in the programme. Ultimately, the challenges were
overcome and the programme achieved its goal of controlling
M.
tanajoa
in Africa using classical biological control. The campaign has had
an enormous impact on subsistence agriculture in Africa and created a legacy of
biological controltraining, infrastructure and experience that is still
evident today.
References
pertinent to this module of information are available in the book “Biological
Control: A Global Perspective.”