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This book shows how Business Centered Maintenance (BCM) methodology can be used to audit and improve the management systems of industrial maintenance departments. Presented from the book:
Maintenance Management Auditing
(Maintenance Snapshot Audit)

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   by Anthony Kelly
Published By:
Industrial Press Inc.
Industrial managers will be better able to audit their own maintenance departments themselves, or better interface and direct audits by external consultants. SALE! Use Promotion Code TNET11 on book link to save 25% and shipping.
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Organization

(a)    A centralised Engineering Project Group (EPG), set up shortly after the 1994 audit was completed, was headed by the Engineering Manager and three professional engineers transferred from the colliery engineering section. Its responsibilities were:

 

(i) to procure new equipment and where necessary to assist in its installation and commissioning;

 

(ii) to provide a project management service for capital and maintenance projects;

 

(iii) to develop standards for underground equipment overhaul and to assist in standardising the equipment maintenance life plans (e.g., for the Longwall), and maintenance support agreements, throughout the collieries;

 

(iv) to aid in ensuring that information (operation standards; areas of high maintenance cost; reliability problems and solutions) on common equipment is communicated throughout the collieries;

 

(v) to help the colliery support engineers in solving complex or technically sophisticated problems;

 

(vi) to co-ordinate the use of equipment shared between collieries.

 

The size of the group was set at a level which could deal with the core workload (arising from responsibilities (iii) to (vi)) and was increased as necessary (i.e., to handle responsibilities (i) and (ii)) by employing contract engineers.

 

There was a consensus among those interviewed that over the three years since the formation of the EPG the engineering performance of the colliery equipment had steadily improved, particularly regarding the specification and control of quality of off-site overhauls. Projects were under way to move from ‘ buy and maintain ’ to ‘ lease , and employ the OEM to maintain .’

 

(b)   It appeared that the appointment of supervisors dedicated to specific equipment had been a success. For example, in the Longwall production group it was felt there had been a considerable improvement, especially in the planning of the down days and of Longwall changes.

 

(c)    The only change to the resource structure had been an enlargement of the second line group (g) and their rostering on a staggered day shift to cover the weekend work. However, the development and production areas remained at the same levels of resource, which were under-utilised.

 

(d)   The main difference between the 1997 administrative structure and that proposed in the original audit was that all the trade force reported directly to the shift supervisors (who were regarded as the resource owner). To arrange resources, the equipment supervisors had to proceed via the shift supervisors. In some cases, the equipment supervisors had become planners and had lost touch both with the trade force and with a knowledge of equipment condition—they spent limited time underground.

 

(e)    There had been no movement towards the longer term improvements indicated in Figure 6–10.

 

Strategy

(f) The two mid-week down shifts were still used for Longwall maintenance, even though the second line resource worked at weekends via a staggered day shift. The reason given for this was that the coal shearing unit, and some others, would not operate the full fifteen shifts without maintenance (although this was done in USA mines).

 

(g) There had been only a marginal improvement in the underground equipment life plans and no improvement whatsoever in the identification and design-out of items exhibiting low reliability or high maintenance cost.

 

Recommendations – 1997

In the light of points (b) to (e) the structure should be modified, in the short term, to operate as indicated in Figure 6–13, this being essentially what was recommended in 1994 but with some clarification in order to overcome the problems identified in point (d). The first line resource should continue to report to the shift supervisors and the second line resource to the Electrical Supervisor and Workshop Supervisor (mechanical). These positions should, however, be renamed Electrical Coordinator and Mechanical Coordinator. When allocated to a downshift, both the shift resource and the second line resource should report to the equipment supervisors responsible for that downshift (e.g., Longwall downshift resources should report to the Longwall Supervisor on all matters associated with the Longwall). This would be a matrix reporting structure, and if it is to function satisfactorily the supervisors must work as a team and link closely with the process co-ordinators—a development which, for its success, may well call for the running of a team training exercise, off-site and

also involving the shift managers. It would be essential that the equipment supervisors develop, for their own areas, improved life plans, spares lists and information systems.

 

Because of the importance of the Longwall, an inter-disciplinary team (a project manager plus representatives from engineering, maintenance, production, technical services and, where necessary, the operations workforce and the tradeforce) should be formed to carry out the following tasks:

 

Identification of the reasons for loss of cutting time and low performance. This may well be a combination of poor maintenance, design and operation.

 

Formulation of actions to overcome the listed problems.

 

Formulation of a schedule for the implementation of the identified actions.

 

This should be a precursor to improving plant reliability control at first level (involving operators, tradesmen and equipment supervisors), at second level (involving equipment supervisors and support engineers) and third level (involving support engineers and the Central Engineering Group).

 

Many of the recommendations arising from the first audit had not been carried out because of shop floor industrial relations problems (see points (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the re-audit review above). The management’s difficulties with problems of this kind were understandable. However, if the company wished to compete internationally then it was essential that these recommendations be pursued. At the time of the re-audit, availability and cost performance were well below international benchmarkstandar ds for underground coal mining.

 

 

FIGURE 6–13 Proposed Administrative Structure (1997 Audit)

 

Copyright © 2006 Industrial Press Inc.

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